Pensions with Endogenous and Stochastic Fertility by Cremer, Helmuth et al.
Pensions with endogenous and stochastic fertility1
Helmuth Cremer, Firouz Gahvari and Pierre Pestieau
University of Toulouse (IDEI and GREMAQ)
21, allée de Brienne
31000 Toulouse - France
Department of Economics
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Urbana, IL 61801, USA
CORE, Delta, CEPR and CREPP, University of Liège
7, bd du Rectorat
4000 Liège - Belgique
September 2004
Revised, March 2006
1This paper has been presented at the CESifo Public Sector Economics Area Conference
(Munich, May 2004) and at the Third Workshop of the FINRET network. We would like to
thank all participants and, in particular our discussants, Henning Bohn and François Maniquet
for their comments. The current version has benefitted substantially from the comments and
suggestions of two anonymous referees of this Journal, and the Editor, Emmanuel Saez.
Abstract
This paper studies the design of a pay-as-you-go social security system in an overlapping
generations model where fertility is in part stochastic and in part determined through
capital investment. If investments are publicly observable, pension benefits must be
linked positively to the level of investment, and payroll taxes negatively to the number
of children. The outcome is characterized by full insurance with all parents, regardless of
their number of children, enjoying identical consumption levels. Without observability,
benefits must increase, and payroll taxes decrease, with the number of children. The
second-best level of investment, and the resulting average fertility rate, are less than
their corresponding first-best levels.
JEL classification: H55; J13.
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1 Introduction
The recent fertility decline in the West is often cited as a major impediment to the
fiscal solvency of pay-as-you-go (PAYGO) social security systems. At the same time,
the pay-as-you-go feature of the social security systems has partly been blamed for
causing the observed fertility decline. The reason for this latter linkage is that in such
systems, each person’s fertility decision, via its impact on the economy’s population
growth rate, affects everybody’s pension benefits. Specifically, an increase in the rate
of population growth increases the number of future workers who will have to support
a retired person. No individual, however, takes this impact into account leading to a
decentralized equilibrium outcome with too few children.1
The above problem is exacerbated by another externality problem associated with
the “quality” of children, and their human capital accumulation, through educational
decisions of the parents. The rate of return of a pay-as-you-go system depends not
just on the fertility rate, but also on productivity growth. The more productive the
children, the higher will be their ability to produce and to pay taxes. This reinforces
the public good nature of a family’s child-rearing activities. It is not surprising then
that some economists have recently advocated a policy of linking pension benefits (or
contributions) to individuals’ fertility choices.2
Such a policy raises a number of objections, however. What truly determines fer-
tility, and what accounts for the observed evolution in fertility behavior, are still open
questions. What is clear though is that no one can fully control fertility. The actual
number of children in a family does not necessarily coincide with the number the parents
initially intended to have. Infertility, premature death, misplanning and multiple births
are some of the reasons explaining this gap. Similarly, one cannot deterministically
determine the future earning abilities of children simply by investing in their education
and training. Making benefits independent of the number of children can then be viewed
1This argument emphasizes the “intergenerational transfer effect,” and ignores the “capital dilution
effect,” associated with an increase in fertility. See the discussion below in subsection 3.4 and particularly
footnote 13.
2Abio et al. (2004), Bental (1989), Cigno et al. (2003), Fenge and Meier (2004), Kolmar (1997), van
Groezen et al. (2000, 2003).
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as a mechanism to insure parents against these various random shocks. This raises the
question of balancing the benefits of providing insurance to the population against the
costs of their not having the “correct” number of children because of the externality
problem.
Three recent papers in this Journal address different aspects of these problems. van
Groezen et al. (2003) study the structure of pension plans and child allowances in
an overlapping generations model where fertility is endogenous but fully deterministic.
In this setting, the question of insurance does not arise. Nor will there be a moral
hazard (incentive) problem as long as the number of children are publicly observable.
All individuals can then be enticed to choose the socially optimal first-best number
of children which corrects for the externality. Cigno et al. (2003) also consider a
model in which fertility is endogenous and fully deterministic. They nevertheless bring
up the question of the trade-off between insurance and incentive through children’s
quality (“lifetime tax contributions”), which they assume to be in part random and
in part determined through costly (and possibly unobservable) actions of the parents.
The moral hazard problem surfaces in their model also, when the parents’ actions are
unobservable. In contrast to van Groezen et al., who have an explicit two-period model,
Cigno et al.’s setup is static. This aspect prevents one from distinguishing between tax
and transfer policies over the individuals’ life cycle–An issue that lies at the heart of
the design of pension plans in overlapping generations models à la Samuelson.
The third paper is Sinn (2004) who is interested more in examining the properties
of a traditional PAYGO system rather than the design of an optimal pension plan. He
considers a model in which fertility is fully random where the parents are either fertile
(having a fixed number of children) or infertile. In this way, he introduces the idea of a
PAYGO pension plan serving as an insurance mechanism against infertility. He is also
concerned with the quality of children which he models deterministically. He discusses
moral hazard in terms of the distortion caused by contributions to the PAYGO system
which acts as a tax on the returns to investment in educating children.
The key distinguishing element between decisions on quantity and quality of children
is one of timing. The number of children born is known quite early; the quality of
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children (i.e. their future earning capacity) is determined much later. To account for
both features one needs a model with at least three periods of decision making. This
makes the design of an optimal pension system rather complicated to study.3 We thus
ignore the externality associated with education decisions and concentrate solely on
fertility. This allows us to consider a setting with two periods of decision making, as
opposed to three, which simplifies the modeling substantially. Specifically, we study
the design of pension systems, within the Samuelson’s (1958) overlapping generations
framework, when the average fertility rate in the society (the “biological interest rate”)
is determined endogenously. Moreover, we allow for the individual fertility rates to
be not only endogenous but stochastic as well. We thus postulate that a prospective
parent’s actual number of children is in part random and in part the result of some early
investment decision the parent makes at the beginning of the first period. We further
assume that the number of children is observed early and the parents can adjust both
their first and the second period consumption levels accordingly.
Given the stochastic nature of fertility, we study the design of optimal pension sys-
tems under two different informational structures. In one, we assume that the prospec-
tive parents’ investments (efforts) in having children are publicly observable. In the
second, we assume that the parents’ investment levels are private information. This
introduces a moral hazard dimension into the problem. Another underlying agency
problem that surfaces, when one is dealing with endogenous fertility, is adverse selec-
tion. It arises if individuals differ in child-rearing ability, or in taste for children. To
simplify matters, and to distinguish between the implications of adverse selection and
moral hazard, this paper focuses solely on the moral hazard issue leaving the adverse se-
lection considerations to another paper.4 This allows us to work with (ex-ante) identical
3Cigno and Luporini (2003) have a three-period model; however they do not optimize over tax
instruments.
4See, Cremer et al. (2004). The moral hazard problem has also been studied by Cremer et al. (2003).
That paper was based on two very restrictive assumptions which we drop here. First, we had ignored
all possibilities for private savings, assuming that the only mechanism for transfer of resources to the
future is (except for possible “voluntary” arrangements between parents and children whereby children
help their retired parents with the expectation that their own children would help them) a PAYGO
public pension system. Second, we had assumed that the number of children is observed late in the first
period so that the first-period consumption could not vary with the number of children.
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individuals.
If fertility were fully deterministic, as in Groezen et al. (2003), the questions of
insurance and moral hazard (incentive) would not arise. All individuals can then be
enticed to choose the socially optimal first-best number of children which corrects for
the externality. On the other hand, if fertility were fully random and independent of
the parents’ investment, there would be no externality and moral hazard (incentive)
problems–only insurance considerations. The optimal social security system then is
one that fully insures parents against the fertility uncertainty.
When fertility is determined in part through investment and in part through ran-
dom elements, there naturally arises a question as to the possible tradeoff between full
insurance and incentive considerations. In a first-best environment, when the parents’
investments in having and raising children are publicly observable, one may be able to
achieve the two objectives of internalizing the externality and full insurance. We show
that this is the case. We also show that the decentralization of the first best requires
pension benefits to be linked positively to the parents’ level of investment in children
(and not to their number), coupled with payroll taxes that vary inversely with the num-
ber of children. The design of an optimal social security system when investments are
publicly observable but individuals’ fertility rates are stochastic, is one dimension along
which we generalize van Groezen et al. (2003).
The more important problem that does not arise in van Groezen et al. (2003) is that
of moral hazard. When the parents’ investment in children is not publicly observable, a
tradeoff between insurance and incentive considerations surfaces. We prove that in this
case, the optimal (second-best) level of investment in children, and the resulting average
fertility rate, are less than their corresponding first-best values. To attain the second-
best, one must institute a pay-as-you-go pension plan under which benefits increase,
and payroll taxes decrease, with the number of children. Moreover, families with more
children should be more than compensated for the extra cost of children so that they
will enjoy a higher level of first-period consumption. Interestingly, with the exception of
the last finding, these results carry over to situations where payroll taxes cannot depend
on the number of children.
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2 The basics
Consider a two-period overlapping generations model in the steady state. Each genera-
tion consists of a continuum of identical individuals. The young have fixed endowments
y and the old live on pensions. Preferences of the young depend positively on their
consumption in the first period, c, and their consumption in the second period, d. We
depart from the bulk of the literature in leaving the “love for children” out of the in-
dividuals’ preferences.5 This simplification has the advantage of putting the problem
into a sharper focus: Parents are not interested in children but the society is (in order
to have them finance pension benefits). This was an important aspect of Samuelson’s
(1958) original analysis; preserving it makes the comparisons of our results to his more
natural.
A parent can have either n1 or n2 children, with n2 > n1. The actual realization of ni
depends on an initial investment in children, k, and on some random shock.Thus when a
parent invests k, he will have n2 children with probability π (k) where 0 6 π (k) 6 1 and
π0 (k) > 0 (π00 (k) < 0 and π (0) > 0). Naturally, the probability of having n1 children
is given by 1− π (k). Whenever it makes the notation simple, we substitute π2 (k) for
π (k) and π1 (k) for 1 − π (k) . The cost of having children is not limited to the initial
investment k. There are other costs that vary proportionately (at the rate of θ ≥ 0) to
the actual number of children. These costs are also borne in the first period.
To keep the model simple, assume that preferences over (ci, di), i = 1, 2, are rep-
resented by an additive utility function. Consequently, at the beginning of the first
period, the expected utility of the young (i.e. future parents) is written as
U =
2X
i=1
πi (k) [u (ci) + v (di)] , (1)
where u (·) and v (·) are strictly concave functions.
There are two potential mechanisms for financing second-period consumptions: stor-
5 Introducing the love for children into individuals’ preferences is an easy undertaking. This would
generally imply that parents would opt for a higher investment level in children thus lowering the
instances under which parents may decide not to invest in children. However, as long as there is no
conflict between the parents’ and the society’s love for children, this will not add to the scope of our
analysis in terms of policy design.
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age or a PAYGO pension plan. Under the storage technology, part of the initial en-
dowment is invested yielding a fixed rate of return, r.6 Under a PAYGO scheme, the
government collects taxes from the current young and distributes the proceeds to the
retired. With the young having, on average,
n¯ (k) = π1 (k)n1 + π2 (k)n2
children, the PAYGO rate of return is n¯ (k) − 1. This corresponds to what Samuelson
called the biological rate of interest.
Observe that while the number of children of a particular family is random, the
fertility rate for the society is not. It is determined fully by the choice of k. This
property, and the existence of a storage technology with a fixed rate of return, imply
that it is possible for the society to transfer resources across different generations in
a deterministic fashion, and at a rate which is independent of the total savings in
the economy. These two properties also imply that the only consideration in choosing
between the storage technology and a pension plan, for transfer of resources, is to
determine which mechanism has a higher implied rate of return. In turn, this has the
strong implication that one of the two mechanisms will always dominate the other. It
will never be optimal to use storage and PAYGO simultaneously. This feature, which
was another fundamental aspect of Samuelson’s (1958) model, allows us to isolate the
effects of making fertility endogenous and stochastic on the choice between the two
mechanisms.
2.1 Laissez faire
Absent any government intervention, each individual maximizes his expected utility
subject to two budget constraints, one of which becoming relevant ex post, depending
on the number of children. The Lagrangian expression associated with the individual’s
problem is
LL =
X
i
½
πi (k) [u (ci) + v (di)] + λi
∙
y − ci −
di
1 + r
− k − niθ
¸¾
.
6The rate of return is net of any “capital depreciation”.
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It follows from the first-order conditions of this problem with respect to ci and di that
v0 (di)
u0 (ci)
=
1
1 + r
, i = 1, 2. (2)
This is the classic condition for optimal intertemporal consumption.
We also have
∂LL
∂k
= π0(k) [u (c2) + v (d2)− u (c1)− v (d1)]−
X
i
πi (k)u0(ci). (3)
Observe that individuals with n1 children have higher disposable incomes, net of cost
of children, than individuals with n2 children. It follows that u (c2) + v (d2) ≤ u (c1) +
v (d1) : utility is higher with n1 children than with n2. From (3) one then obtains that
∂LL/∂k ≤ 0 and
kL = 0. (4)
That under laissez faire k = 0, should not be surprising. Children bestow no utility on
their parents so that there is no reason to invest in them (given that they are costly to
have).7
Having characterized the equilibrium under laissez faire, we next characterize the
first-best solution for this economy and then turn to the second best.
3 The utilitarian first-best
Assume first that the social planner has perfect information, particularly with respect
to the individuals’ investment levels in children k, and that he controls all the relevant
variables in the economy: k, ci, di and Si, where Si denotes the savings of the young in
state i = 1, 2. He sets these variables to maximize the expected lifetime utility in the
steady-state
W =
X
i
πi (k) [u (ci) + v (di)] , (5)
7The individual’s problem has been set up on the assumption that there are no private insurance
markets. If individuals can buy fair insurance, they will pool their resources together and thus maximize
their expected utility subject to the single budget constraintX
i
πi(k)
∙
y − ci −
di
1 + r
− k − θni
¸
.
In this case, one can easily show that we will continue to have k = 0, but that c1 = c2 and d1 = d2.
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subject to the economy’s resource constraint,X
πi (k)
∙
y +
Si(1 + r)
n¯ (k)
− ci − k − θni − Si −
di
n¯ (k)
¸
= 0, (6)
where n¯ (k) ≡ π1 (k)n1 + π2 (k)n2, and the young’s population size is normalized at
one so that there are 1/n¯ (k) old people. Our modeling strategy, with a fixed rate of
return on savings, r, and a non-stochastic aggregate biological rate of return, n¯, implies
that the choice of storage or PAYGO are, as in Samuelson (1958), mutually exclusive.
Expositionally, then, it will be simpler to consider the planner’s problem sequentially.
First, one finds the optimum conditional on the use of storage and PAYGO; then one
compares the levels of welfare achieved at these two conditional optima. This also allows
one to simplify the resource constraint (6) and rewrite it asX
i
πi (k)
∙
y − ci −
di
1 + r
− k − niθ
¸
= 0, (7)
under storage, and as X
i
πi (k)
∙
y − ci −
di
n¯ (k)
− k − niθ
¸
= 0, (8)
under PAYGO.
3.1 Storage
Under the storage technology, the planner maximizes (5) subject to the resource con-
straint (7). Deriving the first-order conditions of this problem, one can easily establish
that c1 = c2 = c; d1 = d2 = d. Thus, not surprisingly, consumption levels are equalized
across individuals with different number of children. The problem can then be written
as
max
c,d,k
WS = u (c) + v (d) , (9)
s.t. y − c− d
1 + r
− k − n¯ (k) θ = 0. (10)
The first-order conditions imply
v0 (d)
u0 (c)
=
1
1 + r
, (11)
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and
kS = 0. (12)
Equation (11) is the optimality condition for intertemporal consumption with the rate of
return r on storage. It is also similar to the expression (2) under laissez faire. Condition
(12) obtains because ∂WS/∂k < 0 (when incorporating the budget constraint). It is
identical to condition (4) under laissez faire.8 As in there, increasing k has only costs and
no benefits.9 The values of c and d that solve this problem depend on (the exogenous)
value of r, as does the associated level of welfare, W ∗S(r). Moreover, it follows directly
from (10) that W ∗S is an increasing function of r.
3.2 PAYGO
The problem of the social planner under a PAYGO pension plan is to maximize (5)
subject to the resource constraint (8). In this case too, one obtains c1 = c2 = c and
d1 = d2 = d. The Lagrangian expression of the problem can then be written as
LP =
∙
u (c) + v (d) + μ
µ
y − c− d
n¯ (k)
− k − n¯ (k) θ
¶¸
,
with c, d and k as decision variables. One obtains the following optimality conditions10
v0 (d)
u0 (c)
=
1
n¯ (k)
, (13)
and
∂LP
∂k
= μ
∙
n¯0 (k) d
n¯2
− 1− n¯0 (k) θ
¸
= 0. (14)
Equation (13) is the counterpart of (11) with n¯ (k)− 1 as the net rate of return on
“savings”. The optimal level of investment in children, kP , is determined according to
the tradeoff stated in equation (14). This condition requires that the cost of increasing
k, which includes the extra cost of children n¯0 (k) θ, equals the benefits associated with
8The solution is thus identical to that under laissez faire with full private insurance.
9This extreme result holds because, as with the laissez faire solution, there are no direct benefits
associated with having children in this setting. To capture such benefits, one may include n as a separate
argument of the utility function. It would then be possible to have kS > 0.
10The first-order condition with respect to k is for an interior solution. If we have a corner solution
k = 0, the solution is identical to a case with exogenous fertility and one is back to the original Samuelson
formulation.
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the induced increase in the return to PAYGO. The level of welfare achieved at the
PAYGO solution is denoted by W ∗P .
3.3 PAYGO versus storage
To determine the first-best solution one must compare the levels of welfare attained
at the two conditional optima. First, observe that both conditional solutions imply
equalization of consumption levels across parents with different number of children.
The parents are thus fully insured for the uncertainty they face over the number of
children they will have. Given this common property, it is intuitively obvious that
the choice between the technologies must depend solely on their respective “rates of
return”. Specifically, when 1+ r ≥ n¯ (kp) , the storage technology dominates. Its return
is at least as high as that of PAYGO, but it does not require the initial investment kP .
Put differently, the rate of return for PAYGO must be higher than the rate of return
on storage to compensate for the investment kP . When 1 + r < n¯ (kp), the choice
between the two technologies is more involved. This is best explained using a graphical
representation in the (c, d) plane; see Figure 1.
Let α represent the optimal allocation between c and d under PAYGO. It corre-
sponds to a point of tangency between an indifference curve and the resource constraint
originating from y−kP − θn¯ (kp) (endowment minus total cost of children) with a slope
(in absolute value) of n¯
¡
kP
¢
. Define rˆ as the rate of return on storage at which first-best
welfare level under storage equals its PAYGO level: W ∗S(rˆ) =W
∗
P . Graphically, 1 + rˆ is
the slope of the budget line (under storage) with horizontal intercept of y − θn¯ (0) and
which is tangent to the indifference curve corresponding toW ∗P .
11 One attains the same
11The graphical representation, and the comparison between 1+r and n¯
¡
kP
¢
, assume no initial fixed
investment costs in the storage technology. This is inconsequential; its only potential effect would be to
possibly change the direction of the inequality rˆ < n¯
¡
kP
¢
− 1 (the critical mechanism-switching rate of
return on storage is less than the PAYGO rate of return) which Figure 1 displays. But this is all that
it may do. The important point is that none of our conclusions rests on the direction of this inequality.
To see why the direction of the inequality may change, let kS denote the cost of investment in storage.
This changes the position of y − θn¯ (0) intercept to y − kS − θn¯ (0) . No further modification is called
for as long as kS + θn¯ (0) < kP + θn¯
¡
kP
¢
. On the other hand, if kS + θn¯ (0) > kP + θn¯
¡
kP
¢
, the
y− kS − θn¯ (0) intercept will be to the left of y− kP − θn¯
¡
kP
¢
intercept so that the line that originates
from y − kS − θn¯ (0), and is tangent to the indifference curve corresponding to W ∗P at β, will have a
steeper slope in absolute value than n¯
¡
kP
¢
(the absolute value of the line through y−kP −θn¯
¡
kP
¢
and
tangent to the same indifference curve). In this case, β will be above and to the left of α. Consequently,
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α
β
γ
1  r̂( )pn k
( )p py k n kθ− − (0)y nθ−
Figure 1: Optimal allocations with storage and PAYGO technologies
utility level under storage at point β, with more first-period and less second-period con-
sumption. Observe also that β is not available unless everyone is subjected to PAYGO.
That is, it is not optimal to use the two mechanisms simultaneously. With r > rˆ, society
would opt for the storage technology and the solution γ. With r < rˆ, the demographic
mechanism dominates storage.
3.4 Decentralization of the optimum
We now briefly examine how the first-best optimum can be decentralized. With the first-
best consumption levels (in both periods) being independent of the number of children,
one may think of the decentralized solution as offering individuals full insurance against
the risk (from a personal perspective) of having many children. When the storage
one chooses PAYGO whenever 1+ r ≤ n¯
¡
kP
¢
. Otherwise, if 1+ r > n¯
¡
kP
¢
, one will opt for one or the
other mechanism depending on how r compares with rˆ. Put differently, one must have rˆ > n¯
¡
kP
¢
− 1.
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technology dominates PAYGO, it suffices to compensate those with n2 children for
their extra cost of raising children. This is achieved by levying a lump-sum tax equal to
π(0) (n2 − n1) θ on parents with n1 children, and giving (1− π(0)) (n2 − n1) θ to parents
who have n2 children. Such a tax and transfer policy fully insures the parents, who will
now face a net cost (inclusive of the tax and transfer) of θn¯(0) in raising their children
regardless of their number, while satisfying the government’s budget constraint.12
When PAYGO dominates storage, decentralization is somewhat more intricate.
First, in order for the payroll taxes (Ti’s) and pension benefits (Pi’s) to satisfy the
government’s budget constraint, and with n¯ (k) young individuals for every old person,
we must have n(k)
P
πi (k)Ti =
P
πi (k)Pi. Second, as with the storage technology,
the individualized payroll taxes must satisfy T1 − T2 = (n2 − n1) θ in order to equalize
first-period consumption levels. Third, to equalize second-period consumption levels,
pensions will have to be independent of the number of children: P1 = P2 = P . Finally,
we also need to induce the “correct” level of investment in children and ensure that
there are no private savings.
If there are no benefits associated with investment in children, no one will choose
a positive level of k. To ensure some investment, pensions must in part be conditioned
on k. Specifically, let kP and dP denote the (PAYGO) first-best values of k and d. Set
P = P + k n(kP ) where P is fixed and satisfies P + kP n(kP ) = dP . It is easy to show
that under this pension scheme, and with the “appropriate” choice of T1 and T2, all
individuals would choose k = kP , opt for zero private savings (negative savings are not
allowed) and choose dP and cP as well (cP is the PAYGO first-best value of c). A subsidy
on k at the rate of n(kP )−1 per unit of k (to ensure a gross return of n(kP )) is necessary
because each individual ignores the atomistic impact of his choice of k on aggregate k
and thus on n(k), the rate of return of the PAYGO system that each person enjoys.
Put differently, an individual’s investment in children creates a positive externality in
that it increases the number of future working persons who will be supporting a retired
person.13 Consequently, unless there is a (Pigouvian) subsidy, individuals will set k at
12Recall that there are (1− π(0)) parents with n1 children, and π(0) with n2 children, so that
(1− π(0))T1 + π(0)T2 = 0.
13This is what the literature refers to as the “intergenerational transfer effect.” It is the only effect
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zero and there will be no investment in children.
Observe that the Pigouvian subsidy is set at a rate that brings the private cost of
investing in k equal to its social cost which is one. To see this, recall that in the above
scheme the subsidy on k is paid in the second period as part of one’s pension benefits.
Discounted to the first period (with a discount rate of 1/n(kP )), its value will be equal
to 1–the marginal cost of k. Observe also that, at the optimal solution, the marginal
cost of k equals the marginal (net) social benefits of k. One can see this by rewriting
(14) as
1 =
n¯0
¡
kP
¢
dP
[n¯(kP )]2
− n¯0
¡
kP
¢
θ,
where the right-hand side of this expression is the net social marginal benefit of k. Its
first terms measures the induced impact on the return of PAYGO, while the second
terms represents the extra cost of raising children.
We summarize the results of this section as
Proposition 1 (i) The first-best allocation under storage requires that parents do not
invest in fertility, have equal consumption levels regardless of their number of chil-
dren in both periods of their lives, and that their first- and second-period consumption
levels satisfy the classic condition for intertemporal consumption at a rate of return
determined by the storage technology. The allocation can be decentralized by levying
a lump-sum tax equal to π(0) (n2 − n1) θ/2 on parents with n1 children, and giving
(1− π(0)) (n2 − n1) θ/2 to each parent who has n2 children.
(ii) The first-best allocation under PAYGO requires that parents make an investment
in fertility equal to kp, the solution to equation (14), have equal consumption levels
regardless of the number of their children in both periods of their lives, and that their first
and second period consumption levels satisfy the condition for intertemporal consumption
at the rate of n(kP ). The allocation can be decentralized by linking pension benefits, P,
associated with increasing fertility in our Samuelsonian setup with a storage technology. If, on the
other hand, the technology for transferring resources across generations is a neoclassical production
function as in Diamond (1965), there will also be a cost associated with investing in fertility which
results in a negative externality. This is the required expansion in capital in order to maintain the same
capital output ratio in the face of an expanding work force as the fertility increases. This is termed
in the literature “the capital dilution effect.” In the presence of this latter effect, the net externality
associated with an increase in fertility is not necessarily positive.
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to investment in children according to P = P + k n(kP ) where P is fixed and satisfies
P + kP n(kP ) = dP (the superscript P denotes a PAYGO first-best value), coupled with
individualized payroll taxes that satisfy T1 − T2 = (n2 − n1) θ > 0 and the government’s
per period budget constraint,
P
πi (k)Ti =
P
πi (k)Pi/n(k).
(iii) Let rˆ denote the rate of return on storage at which first-best welfare level under
storage equals its PAYGO level. Then, for all r < rˆ, PAYGO dominates storage and
for all r > rˆ, storage dominates PAYGO.
4 Second-best solution
The first-best characterization rests on the assumption that the government can control
k fully, either directly or through a subsidy. This will be the case if k (and thus c) are
publicly observable. When the observability assumption is not satisfied, one will be in
a second-best environment. Under this circumstance, the full insurance prescriptions of
a first-best world may not hold. We shall examine this question below.
Assume that k and c are not publicly observable but ni’s (i = 1, 2) are. Public policy
consists of either a tax system while letting the young save for their own retirement;14
or a pension plan through which the government collects taxes from the current young
and distributes the proceeds to the retired. With ni’s being publicly observable, taxes
Ti’s and transfers Pi’s may be conditioned on the number of children. Whether or not
this should be the case is an interesting policy question which this section attempts to
shed light on. Next section studies the setting where contributions are required by law
to be uniform.
4.1 Storage
Under the storage technology, the resource constraint is given byX
i
πi (k)
∙
y − ci −
di
1 + r
− k − niθ
¸
= 0. (15)
This is identical to the first-best constraint. Most significantly, the unobservability
of k is of no relevance here. In particular, there is no reason why individuals should
14Alternatively, the government may institute a fully-funded pension plan, taxing away all savings,
investing (storing) the proceeds and distributing the investments and the returns as pensions.
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be induced to choose a different level of k than they would do otherwise. Indeed,
the (conditional) first-best allocation of subsection 3.4 (which requires equalization of
consumptions levels for parents with different number of children) is attainable as long
as tax payments are not restricted to be uniform. As in the first-best, this is done
through levying a lump-sum tax equal to π(0) (n2 − n1) θ on parents with n1 children,
and giving (1− π(0)) (n2 − n1) θ to parents who have n2 children. The investment level
k is set at zero which is in line with individual incentives. Summing up, with storage
and state-dependant contributions, the (conditional) first- and second-best solutions
coincide.
4.2 PAYGO
Recall that the first-best outcome entailed two properties: full insurance plus an optimal
choice of k such that, given an exogenous rate of return on storage equal to r, n(kp) >
1 + rˆ > 1 + r. With k being directly “under control,” the planner could set it at its
optimal level without one having to forgo the full insurance property. In a second
best environment, k can no longer be directly controlled and keeping the full insurance
property is consistent with k = 0 only. Second-best optimality may then require trading
off the full insurance property for a positive choice of k (although not at its first-best
value). We will see below this is precisely the outcome when one can control k only
indirectly, through the incentives that the pension scheme provides.
The young’s problem, when facing the policy instruments T1, T2, P1 and P2, is
maxc1,c2,k U =
¡
1− π(k)
¢
[u(c1) + v(d1)] + π(k)[u(c2) + v(d2)], (16)
s.t. ci = y − k − Ti − θni i = 1, 2, (17)
di = Pi i = 1, 2. (18)
This yields the following first-order condition for an interior solution for k,
π0(k)
n
u(c2) + v(d2)−
£
u(c1) + v(d1)
¤o
−
¡
1− π(k)
¢
u0(c1)− π(k)u0(c2) = 0. (19)
Naturally, the second-order condition ∆ ≡ (d2U/dk2)|k=ek < 0 must also be satisfied; we
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shall assume throughout the paper that this is the case.15
The first term on the left-hand side of (19) measures the benefit (for the individual)
of increasing k, while the second term measures the cost. Not surprisingly, an interior
solution requires marginal benefits to equal marginal costs. Observe that when the
left-hand side of (19) is non-positive at k = 0, we have a corner solution and the
individual does not invest in k. This occurs for instance when c1 = c2 (i.e., when
T1 − T2 = θ(n2 − n1)) and d1 = d2. The solution to the individual’s problem, denoted
by ek(T1, T2, P1, P2), describes all possible values of k that the government can induce
through its choice of T1, T2, P1 and P2. The following lemma establishes the comparative
static properties of ek(T1, T2, P1, P2), which will prove useful in studying the government’s
problem.
Lemma 1 If ek(T1, T2, P1, P2) is given by an interior solution,
∂ek
∂T1
=
π0(k)u0(c1) + [1− π(k)]u00(c1)
(−∆) ≶ 0 (20)
∂ek
∂T2
=
−π0(k)u0(c2) + π(k)u00(c2)
(−∆) < 0 (21)
∂ek
∂P1
=
−π0(k)v0(d1)
(−∆) < 0 (22)
∂ek
∂P2
=
π0(k)v0(d2)
(−∆) > 0. (23)
At a corner solution, k = 0 and all partial derivatives of ek are also equal to zero.16
The inequality signs are as expected. The ambiguity of the first derivative is due
to the conflicting income and incentive effects of increasing T1. For simplicity we shall
concentrate on the “normal” case which occurs if ∂ek /∂T1 > 0.
15We have
∆ =
π00(k)
π0(k)
X
i
πi(k)u0(ci) + 2π0(k)
£
u0(c1)− u0(c2)
¤
+
X
i
πi(k)u00(ci).
The first and the last expressions in the right-hand side of above are negative due to concavity of u(.)
and π(.) Consequently, as long as c2 does not exceed c1 by “much”, ∆ will be negative.
16At the transition between these two regimes ek may not be differentiable (even though it is continuous
as long as the second-order condition holds). We ignore this technical difficulty for the sake of simplicity.
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Consider now the government problem. A first ingredient is the resource constraint.
With n¯ (k) young individuals for every old person, this is given by
n(k)
£¡
1− π(k)
¢
T1 + π(k)T2
¤
=
¡
1− π(k)
¢
P1 + π(k)P2. (24)
Equation (24) is a rewriting of (8) in terms of the second-best policy instruments. It
requires that total contributions equal total pension benefits. A second element is the
constraint that k = ek(T1, T2, P1, P2) which reflects the government’s indirect control of
the level of investment in children. The conditional second-best problem for the PAYGO
case is then summarized by the Lagrangian
ΓS =
¡
1− π(k)
¢
[u(c1) + v(d1)] + π(k)[u(c2) + v(d2)]
+ μ
©¡
1− π(k)
¢
(n(k)T1 − P1) + π(k)(n(k)T2 − P2)
ª
+ η
£ek(T1, T2, P1, P2)− k¤,
where di = Pi and ci = y − k − Ti − θni (i = 1, 2). The first-order conditions are17
∂ΓS
∂T1
= [1− π(k)][μn(k)− u0(c1)] + η
∂ek
∂T1
= 0, (25)
∂ΓS
∂T2
= π(k)[μn(k)− u0(c2)] + η
∂ek
∂T2
= 0, (26)
∂ΓS
∂P1
= (1− π(k))[v0(d1)− μ] + η
∂ek
∂P1
= 0, (27)
∂ΓS
∂P2
= π(k)[v0(d2)− μ] + η
∂ek
∂P2
= 0, (28)
∂ΓS
∂k
= μ
©
− π0(k)(n(k)T1 − d1) +
¡
1− π(k)
¢
T1(n2 − n1)π0(k)
+ π0(k)(n(k)T2 − d2) + π(k)T2(n2 − n1)π0(k)
ª
− η = 0. (29)
Recall that the definition of ek(T1, T2, P1, P2) encompasses both interior as well as
corner solutions (of the individuals’ problem). We start by considering the case in which
the optimal policy induces an interior solution for ek. The case of k = 0 will be discussed
later.
17 In calculating ∂ΓS/∂k, we have utilized the individual’s first-order condition (19).
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4.2.1 Interior solution for ek
The first-order conditions (25)—(29) indicate that the properties of the second-best solu-
tion depend crucially on the sign of η. To the extent that k entails a positive externality
so that the individuals tend to choose a level of k that is “too low”, one would expect
η > 0. The following lemma shows that this is effectively the case, as long as ∂ek/∂T1 ≥ 0
holds.
Lemma 2 If ∂ek/∂T1 ≥ 0, then η > 0.
Proof. The proof is by contradiction. Assume η ≤ 0. Then the first-order conditions
(27)—(28), together with the concavity of v(·), imply d2 ≤ d1. Similarly, (25)—(26), the
assumption that ∂ek/∂T1 ≥ 0 and the concavity of u(·) result in c2 ≤ c1. Given these
two inequalities, it follows directly from (19) that one cannot have an interior solution
for ek, and we have a contradiction.
We are now in a position to study the properties of the second-best solution. We are
particularly interested in the relationship between payroll taxes and pension benefits
on the one hand, and the number of children on the other. Consider the benefits first.
With η > 0, it follows from (22) and (27) that v0(d1) − μ > 0, and from (23) and (28)
that v0(d2) − μ < 0. The concavity of v(.) then implies d2 > d1. Regarding payroll
taxes, with ∂ek/∂T1 ≥ 0, expression (21) and equations (25)—(26) yield μn ≤ u0(c1) and
μn > u0(c2). Concavity of u(.) then implies c2 > c1, so that T1 − T2 > θ(n2 − n1) > 0.
The following proposition summarizes the second-best results under storage and
PAYGO.
Proposition 2 (a) Under storage the (conditional) first- and second-best solutions co-
incide.
(b) Assume an increase in payroll taxes on parents with small number of children
increases (or leaves unchanged) their investment in children (∂ek/∂T1 ≥ 0). Then in the
second-best allocation under a PAYGO pension system: Benefits should increase with the
number of children (P2 > P1); payroll taxes must decrease with the number of children;
families with a higher number of children are more than compensated for the extra cost
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of children (T1−T2 > θ(n2−n1) > 0, and c2 > c1); the investment in children, and the
resulting average fertility rate, are less than their corresponding first-best levels.
To interpret these results, recall that the first-best solution requires full insurance:
consumption levels of the young and the retired are independent of the number of
children. In a first-best setting, this is provided without preventing k to also be set at
its optimal level. As shown earlier, one could induce an optimal level of k, a publicly
observable variable, by linking pension benefits to it. When k is not observable, this
procedure is no longer feasible. Instead, pension benefits, and contributions, may be
linked to the number of children which are observable, and whose realization can be
influenced by k.
Specifically, if contributions and benefits entail full insurance, individuals will have
no incentive to invest in children and k = 0. To induce a positive k, contributions and/or
benefits must be linked to the number of children. In consequence, one loses the full
insurance property. The optimal policy then strikes a balance between insurance and
incentive considerations. Roughly speaking, if one were to think of k as effort, we have
a moral hazard problem which calls for less-than-full insurance. It is thus not surprising
that d2 > d1 and c2 > c1. The higher consumption levels for parents with a greater
number of children, works as an incentive mechanism to induce positive investment in
children. Observe that c2 > c1 does not just require T1 > T2, it calls for the stronger
condition T1 − T2 > θ(n2 − n1). In words, parents with a higher number of children
should see their taxes reduced by an amount that exceeds the extra costs they incur as
a result of having more children. This may appear surprising at first, but it is easily
understood by realizing that when T1 − T2 ≤ θ(n2 − n1), one can gain on both the
insurance and incentive fronts by widening the gap between T1 and T2.
As a final observation, manipulate the first-order conditions (25)—(28) to arrive at¡
1− π(k)
¢
v0(d1) + π(k)v0(d2)¡
1− π(k)
¢
u0(c1) + π(k)u0(c2)
=
1− ημ
¡ ∂ek
∂P1
+ ∂
ek
∂P2
¢
n(k) + ημ
¡ ∂ek
∂T1
+ ∂
ek
∂T2
¢ . (30)
The left-hand side of equation (30) denotes the marginal rate of substitution between
di’s and ci’s. This was set equal to equal to 1/n(k), their relative “marginal costs”,
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under first best; see equation (13). Consequently, the second best implies that the
individuals’ life-cycle consumption patterns are distorted. If the difference in the young’s
consumption levels is “close” to the difference in the old’s consumption levels (between
people with different number of children),18 the right-hand side of (30) is greater than
1/n(k). This means that the marginal rate of substitution between di’s and ci’s increases
as one goes from first best to second best. Put differently, less resources are transferred
to the future for consumption in the second best relative to first best.
4.2.2 Corner solution at ek = 0
In describing an individual’s behavior facing the policy instruments T1, T2, P1 and P2
under PAYGO, we pointed out that if the individual is induced to choose c1 = c2 and
P1 = P2, then he will opt for k = 0. Similarly, one can deduce from the first-order
conditions (25)—(28) of the second-best problem, that if k = 0 is the second-best choice
of k, optimality requires c1 = c2 and P1 = P2. Consequently, one faces the possibility
of having c1 = c2, d1 = d2 and k = 0 as the second-best solution. To investigate this
possibility, evaluate ∂ΓS/∂k at c1 = c2 = c, d1 = d2 = d, k = 0 and simplify.19 We have
∂ΓS
∂k
= −u0(c) + μπ0(0)(n2 − n1)
∙
d
n(0)
− θn(0)
¸
.
18Specifically,
1− ημ
¡ ∂ek
∂P1
+ ∂
ek
∂P2
¢
n(k) + ημ
¡ ∂ek
∂T1
+ ∂
ek
∂T2
¢ − 1n(k)
=
− ημ
n
π0(k)
£
u0(c1)− u0(c2)
¤
+ π0(k)n(k)
£
v0(d2)− v0(d1)
¤
+
P
πiku00(ci)
o
(−∆)n(k) +
£
n(k) + ημ
¡ ∂ek
∂T1
+ ∂
ek
∂T2
¢¤ .
The denominator of this expression is positive. To see this, observe that the property d2 > d1 (which
follows from our assumption that ∂ek/∂T1 > 0), coupled with the concavity of v(.), imply
∂ek
∂P1
+
∂ek
∂P2
=
π0(k)
£
v0(d2)− v0(d1)
¤
(−∆) < 0.
It then follows from equation (30) that
n(k) +
η
μ
¡ ∂ek
∂T1
+
∂ek
∂T2
¢
> 0.
The numerator will also be positive as long as u0(c1) − u0(c2) > 0 is “close,” in absolute value, to
n(k)
£
v0(d2)− v0(d1)
¤
< 0.
19The expression for ∂ΓS/∂k differs from that given by (29) because the latter was derived assuming
an interior solution for k˜.
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One can see from this expression that ∂ΓS/∂k may take a negative value at k = 0. Thus
we cannot a priori rule out a solution with d1 = d2, c1 = c2 and k = 0. This would be
the case if π is not very responsive to k (so that π0(0) is close to zero), if θ is “large”, or
if individuals have a very large degree of risk aversion.20 If this happens, the tradeoff
between c and d will again be at its first-best value of 1/n(k), albeit at k = 0. [See
equation (30) which would then simplify to (13)]. The solution is effectively the same
as the first-best outcome under storage, with a rate of return equal to (1 + r) = n(0).
4.3 PAYGO versus storage in the second best
Denote the welfare achieved at the second-best solution by WSBP (for PAYGO) and
WSBS (r) (for storage). As in the first best, the choice between the two mechanisms
hinges on the exogenous level of r. The results obtained in subsections 4.2 and 4.1
imply that WSBP ≤W ∗P ,21 while WSBS (r) =W ∗S(r) holds for any level of r. Thus, under
PAYGO, the unobservability of k results in a welfare loss. Under storage, on the other
hand, the first-best outcome is achieved even if k is unobservable. Let rSB denote the
critical level of return satisfying WSBS (r
SB) =WSBP < W
∗
P . It then immediately follows
that rSB < br, where br is the critical level in the first best. In other words, whenever
storage is optimal in the first best, it is also optimal in the second best. On the other
hand, when PAYGO is optimal in the first best, it may or may not be optimal in
the second best. Put differently, the range of values of r for which storage dominates
PAYGO is larger in the second best than in the first best. This is depicted in Figure 2.22
We end this section with another proposition.
Proposition 3 Let rSB denote the rate of return on storage at which second-best welfare
level under storage equals its PAYGO level [WSBS (r
SB) = WSBP ]. We have: r
SB < rˆ,
20With a large degree of risk aversion, individuals would want to set c1 = c2 and d1 = d2. It then
follows from the young’s optimization problem (16)—(18) that they will set k = 0.
21The equality sign applies if the first- and second-best outcomes under PAYGO are given by the
corner solution k = 0, and c1 = c2, d1 = d2.
22Observe also that a simple graphical representation as in Figure 1 can no longer be provided because,
in the second best under PAYGO, c1 6= c2 and d1 6= d2. The exception is when the PAYGO second best
implies a corner solution for k = 0. We would then have, for both mechanisms, budget lines starting
from y and it will be sufficient to compare r with n(0).
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1 n¯(0) 1 + rSB 1 + rˆ
1 + r
PAYGO
(welfare: WSBP =W
∗
S(r
SB))
Storage
(welfare: W ∗S(r))
Figure 2: PAYGO versus storage in the second best.
WSBS (r
SB) = W ∗S(r
SB), and WSBP < W
∗
P [rˆ is the welfare-equalizing rate under first
best, and ∗ indicates first-best values.]
5 Second best PAYGOwith state-independent first-period
taxes
The discussion thus far has allowed for tax and benefit schemes that are both state
dependent. As a policy prescription, however, one may want to restrict pension contri-
butions and/or pension benefits to be independent of the number of children. Indeed,
depending on the timing of the decision process, there are circumstances under which
differentiation of T1 from T2 may not even be possible.23 With this in mind, we shall now
discuss a special case of our model where the tax payments do not vary with the num-
ber of children. This setting too constitutes a departure from the traditional PAYGO
pension plans under which it is not just the taxes on the young, but also the pension
benefits of the old, that are invariant to the number of children.
Formally, observe first that the equality of first-period tax payments implies, from
(17),
c1 − c2 = θ(n2 − n1) > 0.
Thus, individuals who end up with more children would also have to pay in full the
corresponding additional costs (this is in addition to k paid by everyone). Now, as far
as the individuals are concerned, they face the same optimization problem as before
which would then yield a first-order condition identical to (19).24 The solution for k
23This will be the case, for example, if taxes are levied before n is realized.
24With T1 = T2, c1 − c2 = θ(n2 − n1) > 0 so that u0(c1) < u0(c2). It then follows from the expression
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will depend on P1, P2 and T (= T1 = T2), with the expressions for ∂ek/∂P1 and ∂ek/∂P2
remaining unchanged from (22)—(23). One can also easily show that, with c1 > c2,
∂ek/∂T = ∂ek/∂T1+ ∂ek/∂T2 < 0.
Regarding the government’s optimization, one must now impose an additional con-
straint (T1 = T2 = T ) on the second-best problem. This is summarized by the La-
grangian
ΓC =
¡
1− π(k)
¢
[u(c1) + v(d1)] + π(k)[u(c2) + v(d2)]
+ μ
©¡
1− π(k)
¢
(n(k)T1 − P1) + π(k)(n(k)T2 − P2)
ª
+ η
£ek(T1, T2, P1, P2)− k¤+ λ(T1 − T2),
with d1 = P1 and d2 = P2. The first-order conditions with respect to P1, P2 and k, are
as in the unconstrained case. As in that case, we will again have, as long as the solution
for ek is interior, η > 0 and d2 > d1. Interestingly, these results now hold regardless of
the sign of ∂ek/∂T1.25 Of course, the levels of d1, d2 and k will be different as c1 now
exceeds c2 rather than the other way around.
To see another implication of the T1 = T2 constraint, assume again that ∂ek/∂T1 ≥ 0.
Under this circumstance, one can show that λ < 0. Thus reducing T2 and increasing T1
from their current equal value are welfare improving. Finally, corresponding to equation
(30) under the unconstrained second best, we now have¡
1− π(k)
¢
v0(d1) + π(k)v0(d2)¡
1− π(k)
¢
u0(c1) + π(k)u0(c2)
=
1− ημ
¡ ∂ek
∂P1 +
∂ek
∂P2
¢
n(k) + ημ
¡ ∂ek
∂T
¢ > 1n(k) , (31)
where the inequality sign follows from the fact that ∂ek/∂T = ∂ek/∂T1+∂ek/∂T2 < 0, and
∂ek/∂P1+ ∂ek/∂P2 < 0.26 This duplicates the result under the unrestricted second best.
However, there, we had to assume that the differences in consumption levels between
people with different number of children were “close” for when they are young and when
for ∆ in footnote 15 that ∆ < 0 and the second-order condition is now necessarily satisfied.
25This follows because in this case c1 > c2 holds without one having to assume that ∂ek/∂T1 ≥ 0. The
proofs of η > 0 and d2 > d1 are as in the unrestricted case.
26We have
∂ek
∂P1
+
∂ek
∂P2
=
π0(k)
£
v0(d2)− v0(d1)
¤
(−∆) .
With d2 > d1, the concavity of v(·) implies v0(d2)− v0(d1) < 0, and the above expression is negative.
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they are old. We can now state, unambiguously, that as long as taxes are independent
of the number of children, less resources are transferred to the future relative to the
first best.
We summarize these results as
Proposition 4 Assume T1 = T2 = T :
(i) The constraint implies c1 > c2 thus reversing the corresponding (unconstrained)
second-best finding on first-period consumption levels. The other second-best results
continue to hold. That is, pension benefits increase with the number of children so that
d2 > d1; and that investment in children and the average fertility rate are less than their
corresponding first-best levels.
(ii) Reducing T2 and increasing T1 from T are welfare improving (if ∂ek/∂T1 ≥ 0).
(iv) Less resources are transferred to the future relative to the first best.
6 Two polar cases
Finally, it will be instructive to contrast the lessons of our model with those obtained
in two polar cases: one where fertility is controlled in a deterministic way, and the
other where fertility is random and purely exogenous. Consider first the case where
fertility is perfectly controllable. Clearly, in a deterministic environment, there is no
need to provide insurance. One only needs to worry about incentives and ensure the
“correct” choice of k. A simple formalization of this idea within our model is to assume
that k takes only two values k ∈ {k1, k2}, and that k1 leads to n1 and k2 > k1 to n2.
Assume further that the rate of return to storage is low enough that a PAYGO with k1
is preferable to storage. Then, with children having no intrinsic benefits, parents will
always choose k1 even when k2 happens to be optimal if contributions and pensions
are independent of the number of children. However, with ni being observable, ki
will also be observable. One should then be able to fully circumvent the potential
moral hazard problem and ensure that the first-best outcome is attained. To align the
individuals’ and the society’s preferences, the government should impose the ex-ante
contribution/benefit package of (T1, P1) or (T2, P2), depending on the number of their
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number children, on all individuals. The contributions and benefits tax are set such
that the optimal intertemporal allocation rule u0(y − ki − Ti − θni) = niv0(Pi), and the
government’s budget constraint Pi = niTi, are satisfied. The individuals would then
choose k ∈ {k1, k2} such that Ui = u(y − ki − Ti − θni) + v(niTi) is maximal; precisely
as the society would want to.
Consider next the other extreme setting in which there is no control over fertility.
There is no moral hazard (incentive) problem here and the optimal policy (whether k
is observable or not) requires k = 0 and full insurance. This is precisely the outcome
under the structure of our model when π0 (k) = 0, where the optimal social security
system fully insures parents against the fertility uncertainty. The government chooses
its pension benefits P and lump-sum tax payments T1 and T2 to ensure that its budget
constraint is satisfied, c1 = c2(= c), d1 = d2(= d), and u0(c) = n¯(0)v0(d). These values
implement the optimum as the individuals would choose k = 0, c and d. (we are again
assuming that the rate of return on storage is low enough that it is dominated by the
PAYGO scheme). The first- and second-best solutions derived in this paper offer a
compromise between these two extreme cases.
7 Conclusion
The PAYGO social security has traditionally been studied as if the rate of fertility were
given or at least not controllable. More recently, a series of papers have focused on the
endogeneity of fertility and the need to make parents responsible when their behavior
have social externalities. In the case of PAYGO pension plans, social externalities tend
to be positive implying that the laissez-faire generates a suboptimal population growth.
In other cases, such as the “Tragedy of the Commons,” social externalities are negative
and population growth is excessive. Making people responsible for their fertility raises
problems when the control is only partial because fertility involves some randomness.
It is then important to insure parents against fertility shocks they are not responsible
for.
We have shown that, with positive externalities, one should grant parents who have
more children larger pension benefits. At the same time, the parents’ contributions
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must be linked negatively to their investment in children if the investments are publicly
observable, and to the number of children if investments are not observable. With
observability, the outcome is characterized by full insurance with all parents enjoying
identical consumption levels regardless of their number of children, when they work as
well as when they are retired. In the absence of observability, families with more children
should be more than compensated for the extra cost of children so that they can enjoy
a higher level of first-period consumption. Moreover, the optimal level of investment in
children, and the resulting average fertility rate, will be less than their corresponding
first-best levels. Finally, we have shown that, except for the extra compensation result,
all other second-best results carry over to situations where payroll taxes cannot depend
on the number of children.
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